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A RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION OR INSINUATION? THE
SUPREME COURTS HOLDING IN PORTUONDOV.AGARD

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are charged with a crime that you did not
commit. Forced to attend your own trial, you choose to testify on
your own behalf. The prosecutor conducts his best spin to discredit
you, but his attempts are largely unsuccessful. Not only is your
story consistent with that of other witnesses, but it is a plausible
accounting of the disputed facts. The reason: your story is the truth.
Nevertheless, in summation, the prosecutor attacks your credibility.
His argument, however, addresses no inconsistencies, no physical
evidence, and no concrete reason to cast doubt on your story.
Instead, he argues that your presence in the courtroom provided you
with an opportunity to tailor your own testimony to meet the facts
presented at trial. The jury believes his argument and sends you to
prison. Have you received a fair trial?
The above hypothetical addresses two competing considerations.
The first is a prosecutor's ability to effectively argue his case. The
second is a defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him,1 to testify on his own behalf,2 and to receive a fair
trial.' This conflict derives from the fact that while a defendant has
the right to tell his side of the story, he does not have the right to do
so unchallenged. He may be impeached,4 his prior bad acts may be
brought to the jury's attention,5 and his credibility may be attacked

1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states: "the accused shall enjoy
the right ...to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987) (stating that
"[tihe right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial... is one of the rights that 'are
essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process") (quoting Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975)).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "[No state] shall
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw .... "
4. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958) (stating "[a defendant] has no
right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open
to a cross-examination upon those facts) (quoting Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304,
315 (1900)).
5. See FED. R. EvID. 609.
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in equal measure with that of other witnesses.6 The narrow but
important question is whether the insinuation made by the
prosecutor for the first time in summation is a fair commentary on
the defendant's credibility or an impermissible use of the defendant's constitutional rights as evidence against him.
In Portuondo v. Agard,7 the Supreme Court decided it was the
former, concluding that a New York prosecutor's argument identical
to the above hypothetical violated neither the Fifth, the Sixth, nor
the Fourteenth Amendments.8 This decision reversed the Second
Circuit, which held that it was unconstitutional for a prosecutor to
insinuate for the first time in summation that a defendant's
presence in the courtroom provided him an opportunity to tailor his
testimony to meet the facts presented at trial.9 The Second Circuit's
holding was based on the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v.
California.'° Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that
Griffin was a "poor analogue" to Agard." Unlike Griffin, in which
the jury was asked to infer guilt from the defendant's refusal to
testify at trial, 2 the Court believed that the prosecutor's argument
in this case attacked the defendant's credibility as a witness,
notwithstanding the fact that the remarks were first made in
summation and lacked any supporting evidence.'" The Court also
concluded that the remarks were not a violation of due process,
reasoning that there is not an implicit promise of impunity associated with compelling a defendant's presence in the courtroom. 4
This note addresses the Supreme Court's holding in Agard and
argues that within the confines of the narrow question presented,
the Court should have affirmed the Second Circuit. Before doing so,
this note first surveys the decisions that had an impact on the
Court's decision. It then focuses briefly on the Second Circuit's
holding before turning its attention to Justice Scalia's majority
opinion and Justice Ginsburg's dissent. This note then argues that
the Court's holding in Griffin and the cases that have followed its

6. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,235-36 (1980) (citing numerous decisions
regarding a defendant's decision to testify on his own behalf).
7. 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000).
8. See id. at 1120-25.
9. See Agardv. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696,709 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000).
10. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
11. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1121.
12. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
13. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1126-27.
14. See id. at 1128 (assuming that the defendant is required to attend his trial).
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rationale provide both the precedent to support the Second Circuit's
conclusion and the appropriate interpretation of the Constitutional
rights of the accused. Finally, this note suggests that the Court's
holding tips the balance too far in the favor of prosecutors by
allowing the guilty and the innocent alike to have their credibility
assailed at a point too late to effectively rebut the accusation.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The PenaltyAnalysis
In Griffin v. California,5 the Supreme Court concluded that the
Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled testimony also
includes the implied right to be free from adverse inferences
associated with the defendant's decision to remain silent. 6 The
Court reasoned that adverse inferences exact a penalty on the
defendant for
exercising a right guaranteed him by the
17
Constitution.
Griffin was charged with first degree murder. 8 After the evidence
was presented, and consistent with California law,' 9 the jury was
instructed that in its deliberations, it could consider any unfavorable inference arising from the defendant's failure to deny or explain
the evidence against him, regardless of whether the defendant
testified at trial.2 ° Griffin was convicted, and the California
Supreme Court affirmed. 2 The U.S. Supreme Court overturned
Griffin's conviction.2 2 Despite the jury instruction that the failure to
deny or explain facts for which the defendant had knowledge did not
create a presumption of guilt, the Court held that California's
comment law imposed a penalty on the defendant for exercising his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.2 3 The Court reasoned that
15.

380 U.S. 609 (1965).

16. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609. The Fifth Amendment states that "No person ... shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609.
18. See id.
19. At the time of Griffin's trial, the California Constitution permitted comment by both
the court and counsel. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127 (West 2000) (stating that"in any criminal
case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony
any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented on by the court").
20. See id.
21. See People v. Griffin, 383 P.2d 432 (Cal. 1963).
22. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609.
23. See id. at 610, 614.
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"the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal
Government, and in its bearing on the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either comment by the prosecution
on the accused's silence or2 4instructions by the court that such
silence is evidence of guilt."
Later in Doyle v. Ohio,2 5 the Court followed Griffin's rationale,
holding that cross-examination designed to impeach a defendant's
exculpatory story outlined for the first time at trial by use of the
defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence was a due process
violation.2 6 While the state argued that the prosecutor's questions
were justified by way of necessity," the Court reasoned that the
defendant's silence proved nothing since the defendant was advised
by police that he did not have to speak.2" As illustrated by the
Court's later holding in Jenkins v. Anderson,2 9 the government's
inducement of the defendant's silence was the deciding factor.3 °
In Jenkins, the Court concluded that a defendant's prearrest
silence may be used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. 3 '
The defendant advanced a self-defense claim in response to charges

24. Id. at 609. Griffin was premised on the Court's earlier holding in Wilson v. United
States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893). At issue in Wilson was an act of Congress that simultaneously
granted competency to defendants in federal courts, but forbade a defendant's refusal to
testify to be used as evidence against him. See Wilson, 149 U.S. at 65 (analyzing 18 U.S.C. §
3481 (1985)). The Court in Griffin concluded that "[if the words Fifth Amendment' are
substituted for'act' and for 'statute,' the spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause is reflected."
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
25. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
26. See id. at 611.
27. See id. at 629. The state argued that an exculpatory story at trial and silence at the
time of arrest implied that the story was fabricated at some point, and justified inquiry into
the silence for the limited purpose of impeachment. See id.
28. See id. at 617 (concluding that "[silence in the wake of these warnings may be
nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Mirandarights"). The Court went on to
state:
"When a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that he may
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he may
have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not comport with due
process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence
at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts
of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference
might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony .... "
Id. at 619 (quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171,182-83 (1975) (White, J., concurring)).
29. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
30. See id. at 247.
31. See id. at 238 (concluding that "[tihe Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of
prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility").
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that he committed murder.3 2 During cross-examination the prosecutor asked why the defendant did not go directly to the police with his
story, and then insinuated during summation that the defendant's
actions were inconsistent with his self-defense claim.3" While the
defendant argued that Doyle prohibited the prosecutor's questions,
the Court concluded that "impeachment follow[ed] the defendant's
own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advance[ ]the
truthfinding function of the criminal trial."34 The distinguishing
factor was that "no governmental action induced [the defendant] to
remain silent." 5
Griffin's reasoning was also expanded to situations in which the
government unnecessarily chilled the defendant's exercise of his
constitutional rights. For example, in Brooks v. Tennessee,36 the
Court held that a Tennessee statute requiring a criminal defendant
to testify before any other defense evidence was presented,37 violated
his Fifth Amendment right to testify on his own behalf.3" Citing
Griffin, Justice Brennan concluded that the statute "'cut[ ] down on
the privilege [to remain silent] by making its assertion costly.' 39 In
an argument similar to that made in Agard, Tennessee contended
that the statute reflected the legitimate state interest of reducing
peijury.4 ° Justice Brennan rejected this contention, concluding that
the government's interest in furthering the truth seeking process
did not outweigh the accused's right to testify.4 This conclusion was

32. See id. at 231.
33. See id. at 234 (arguing that it took the defendant two weeks to go to the police).
34. Id. at 238; see also Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926) (holding a
defendant's waiver is not partial, and once it is cast aside a defendant may not reassume its
protections).
35. Id. at 240.
36. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
37. See id. at 611. The statute at issue was TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955). Section
40-2403 provided that "[a] defendant desiring to testify shall do so before any other testimony
for the defense is heard by the court trying the case." Id. Section 40-2403 is also cited in its
entirety in the opinion. See Brooks, 406 U.S. at 606.
38. See Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611.
39. Id. (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
40. See id. at 607 ('The rule that a defendant must testify first is related to the ancient
practice of sequestering prospective witnesses in order to prevent their being influenced by
other testimony in the case.").
41. See id.at 611 (acknowledging a defendant's increased ability to tailor testimony if he
is not required to testify first). The Court stated that "[a]Ithough the Tennessee statute [did]
reflect a state interest in preventing testimonial influence... that interest [is not] sufficient
to override the defendant's right to remain silent at trial." Id.
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based on the premise that a defendant might not know at the outset
of trial whether his testimony will be needed.42
Most recently, in Mitchell v. United States, 43 the Court concluded
that because a guilty plea is not a waiver of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,4 the government
may not make use of adverse inferences associated with the defendant's choice to remain silent at a later sentencing hearing.45 Citing
Griffin, Justice Kennedy concluded that "[t]he normal rule in a
criminal case is that no negative inference from the defendant's
failure to testify is permitted."46 While the government argued that
the defendant waived all protection by pleading guilty, the majority
believed this reasoning "turn[ed the Fifth Amendment's] constitutional shield into a prosecutorial sword."47
In Mitchell, the defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and reserved her right to contest the quantity at
sentencing.4" At the sentencing hearing, the government sought to
elicit the amount through cross-examination,49 so the defendant
attempted to invoke her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.50
The district court ruled that she waived this right by pleading
guilty.5 ' The Supreme Court disagreed, believing that this would
allow the government to indict a suspect without specifying the
quantity of drugs, to obtain a guilty plea, and then to put the
defendant on the witness stand to fill in the missing amount.52 This
tactic, the Court perceived, used the defendant "as an instrument in
his or her own condemnation, undermining the long tradition and
vital principle that criminal proceedings rely on accusations proved
by the Government, not on inquisitions conducted to enhance its
own prosecutorial power. " "

42. See id. at 612.
43. 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
44. See id. at 315.
45. See id. at 329 (stating "[tihe concerns which mandate the rule against negative
inferences at a criminal trial apply with equal force at sentencing").
46. Id. at 327-28 (citing Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614).
47. Id. at 322.
48. See id. at 319.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 324-25.
53. Id. at 325 (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
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Griffin's logic, however, has not been universally heralded. For
example, when the decision was handed down, Justice Stewart
dissented, complaining that California's comment law did not
actually compel the defendant to do anything.54 Justice Stewart
reasoned that "whatever compulsion may exist derives from the
defendant's choice not to testify, not from any comment by court or
counsel."55 Arguing that the Fifth Amendment was designed to
protect against trial by inquisition,56 Justice Stewart reasoned that
California's comment rule did nothing more than highlight facts
that bore on the defendant's credibility.57
Stewart's arguments have persevered. Most recently, in Mitchell,
decided a mere six months before the Court heard oral argument in
Agard, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Thomas wrote a vigorous dissent in response
to the Court's continued expansion of Griffin.58 Justice Scalia
attacked Griffin's basic constitutional premise, arguing that it was
"awrong turn-which is not cause enough to overrule it, but is cause
enough to resist its extension."59 Justice Thomas agreed, but wrote

54. See Griffn v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 621 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 620.
56. See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing the history of the Fifth Amendment).
When a suspect was brought before the Court of High Commission or the Star
Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was asked of him, and
subjected to a far reaching and deeply probing inquiry in an effort to ferret out
some unknown and frequently unsuspected crime. He declined to answer on
pain of incarceration, banishment, ormutilation. And ifhe spoke falsely, he was
subject to further punishment. Faced with this formidable array ofalternatives,
his decision to speak was unquestionably coerced.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart argued that "ifany compulsion be
detected in the California procedure, it is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature
than that involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment
guarantee."Id. Moreover, Justice Stewart argued that the jury will realize that the defendant
has not testified regardless of whether the prosecutor brings it to their attention. See id. at
621; see alsoAgard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 718 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing that jurors expect
the defendant to be present at trial).
58. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Like Justice Stewart before him,
see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, Justice Scalia also believes that the historical
pretext of Griffin is inaccurate. See id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating "Griffin's
pedigree is equally dubious").
59. Id. at 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Scalia argued thatwhatever social
utility is provided through restraint of a prosecutor's comments regarding a defendant's
exercise ofher Fifth Amendment rights, there is no constitutional guarantee of restraint. See
id. at 335 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Whatever the merits ofprohibiting adverse inferences as
a legislative policy,. . . the text and history of the Fifth Amendment give no indication that
there is a federal constitutionalprohibition on the use of a defendant's silence as demeanor
evidence.").
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separately, indicating his willingness to revisit the decision under
appropriate circumstances."
B. Impeachment
While the Court is protective of an individual's constitutional
rights, it has also sought to achieve fairness in the adversarial
process by not instilling an unfair litigation advantage in defendants. For example, in Brown v. United States,6 the Court concluded that a testifying defendant may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness.6 2 The defendant
testified on her own behalf in a denaturalization proceeding,
asserting she did not further Communism in this country during the
ten-year period prior to her naturalization.6 3 She then sought to
invoke her Fifth Amendment rights in response to questions put
forth to her on cross-examination.6 4 The defendant argued that a
witness does not waive her Fifth Amendment rights through
"denials and partial disclosures, but only through testimony that
itself incriminates."6 5 The Court disagreed, stating that "'[a
defendant] has no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which
tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination
upon those facts."'66
Moreover, in Reagan v. United States,6 7 the Court concluded that
when a defendant testifies, the jury may be instructed that the
defendant's interest in the trial creates an incentive to lie.6 Reagan
involved a different provision of the same act at issue in Wilson v.
United States.6 9 The Court opined that while a defendant's choice to

60. Justice Thomas was much harsher in his criticism, advocating the overruling of
Griffin at an appropriate time. See id. at 341 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[Sltaredecisis is 'at

its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only
by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.'" (quoting Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997))).
61. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
62. See id. at 154-55.
63. See id. at 150.
64. See id. at 152.
65. Id. at 154.
66. Id. at 155 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900)).
67. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
68. See id. at 305-06 (stating that while it is the "province of the court" to point out
matters that effect credibility, it is improper to charge the jury directly that a particular
witness is not credible).
69. 149 U.S. 60, 65 (1893).
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remain silent could not be brought to the attention of the jury, a
defendant who elects to take the witness stand may have his
credibility attacked like any other witness.7 ° The Court reasoned
that a jury may "properly consider his manner of testifying, the
inherent probabilities of his story, the amount and character of the
contradictory testimony, the nature and extent of his interest in the
trial, and the impeaching evidence in determining how much of [sic]
credence he is entitled to."7' The premise was that all testifying

witnesses were to be treated the same.72 Moreover, while the Court
concluded that the defendant's interest in the outcome of the trial
may properly be considered, 3 it specifically stated that the defendant's testimony may not be singled out and denounced as false.74
III. THE CASE

A. The Testimony and Evidence Presentedat Trial
Ray Agard and Nessa Winder met at a Manhattan night club on
April 27, 1990, and later that evening had sexual relations.75 The
following weekend Winder and her roommate, Breda Keegan, again
met Agard, who was accompanied by his roommate, Freddy, and
another friend, Albert Kiah.76 During the evening, the group
consumed vast quantities of alcohol, and several, including Winder,
also used cocaine.77 After visiting several other nightclubs, the group
returned to Agard's apartment early the next morning.78 The events
that took place at the apartment that morning were disputed.
Winder claimed that the following morning Agard raped and

70. See Reagan, 157 U.S. at 305 (stating the defendant maybe fully cross-examined and
impeached).
71. Id.
72. See id. ("[Tihe limits of suggestion are the same in respect to him as to others.").
73. See id. at 306 (statingthatwhile the defendant's interest no longer prohibits him from
testifying, his interest is to be considered in judging his credibility).
74. See id. at 305 (stating "[tihe fact that he is a defendant does not condemn him as
unworthy of belief').
75. See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1997), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 1119
(2000).
76. See id. at 699.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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sodomized her.7 9 Agard claimed the couple engaged in consensual
sex, as they had the previous weekend. °
Agard corroborated major portions of Keegan's and Winder's
testimony, yet disputed several key facts. First, while Keegan
testified that Agard erupted violently in reaction to her suggestion
that she take Winder home shortly after the group arrived at his
apartment,"' Agard denied the violent outburst and claimed that he
was merely "annoyed" with Keegan because her boisterous demands
had disturbed his landlady. 2 Moreover, while both Keegan and
Winder testified that Winder was asleep before the party returned
to Agard's apartment,8 3 both Agard and Kiah testified that Winder
was overtly affectionate during a car ride from one nightclub to
another.84 Agard also testified that Winder consented to anal
intercourse the first weekend they met and that she consented to
vaginal intercourse the morning of the alleged assault.8 5
In contrast, Winder testified that she awoke the following
morning wearing only a vest.8 6 She claimed that Agard made
advances toward her that morning, and that after she refused, he
held her at gunpoint and raped and sodomized her multiple times.8 7
Agard denied brandishing the weapon, maintaining that Winder
found his gun when she borrowed his robe. 8 Moreover, while
Winder left the apartment with a black eye that she claimed was
inflicted during the struggle, 9 Agard claimed the blow was an
instinctive reaction to Winder first striking him.9" Agard testified
that Winder was nervous that her boyfriend might discover her
infidelity.9 ' In order to comfort her, he approached Winder from
behind and put his hands on her shoulders.9 2 Winder then turned

79. See id. at 701.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 699-700.
82. See id. at 701.
83. See id. at 699.
84. See id. at 701-02.
85. See id. at 701. In contrast, Winder claimed that Agard showed her pornographic
movies depicting anal intercourse, and "motion[ed] that way" while the couple engaged in
other sexual acts, but that she had refused. Id. at 699.
86. See id. at 700.
87. See id. at 700-01 (describing in detail the events of the alleged assault).
88. See id. at 701.
89. See id. at 700.
90. See id. at 702.
91. See id. at 701.
92. See id.
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and scratched his lip, resulting in him "mushing"her face.9 3 Finally,
Agard claimed he telephoned to apologize for striking Winder.9"
Winder, however, claimed the call was a reaction to the rape.9 5
The physical evidence was equally inconclusive. Winder's medical
examination revealed no trauma to her anus or vagina.9 6 Moreover,
while samples for a rape kit were taken from Winder's mouth,
vagina and anus, only the vaginal specimen tested positive for
spermatozoa.9 7 Tending to discredit Agard's testimony, a search of
his apartment did result in recovery of a handgun and shells.9"
Agard first denied to police that he owned a gun, but later recanted
this statement and claimed the weapon did not work.9 9 To his credit,
however, in his statements to police Agard was adamant that he and
Winder had engaged in consensual sexual relations.0 0
B. ProceduralHistory
1. State Court
Agard was convicted in New York state court of one count of anal
sodomy, felony assault in which rape was the underlying felony, and
two counts of third degree weapons possession.' 0 ' As the evidence
was inconclusive, the jury's decision ultimately hedged on credibility. Perhaps anticipating this, the prosecutor argued in summation:
You know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses [in this
case] the defendant has a benefit and the benefit that he has.., is he
gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all the other witnesses
before he testifies .... That gives [him] a big advantage, doesn't it, [He]

93. See id. at 701-02.
94. See id. at 702.
95. See id. at 701.
96. See id. Winder was examined on the afternoon of the alleged assault. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 702. At trial, nineteen counts were submitted to the jury. Two concerned
Keegan, fourteen involved Winder, and three were weapons charges. See id. The assault
conviction was dismissed as "repugnant to the rape acquittal." Id. Additionally, one of the
weapons convictions was reversed on appeal. See Peoplev. Agard, 606 N.Y.S.2d 239,240 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1993) (explaining that under New York law, third degree possession of a weapon
is a continuing offense for which a defendant could not be convicted twice when under each
conviction he possessed the same weapon).
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get[s] to sit here and think what am I going to say and how am I going
to say it? How am I going to fit it into the evidence? 2

Agard objected to the argument and later moved for a mistrial,
claiming the remarks violated his Sixth Amendment right to be
present in the courtroom and to confront the witnesses against
him.13 The trial court disagreed, concluding that the prosecutor
merely commented on a matter of fact." 4 The appellate division
affirmed, finding Agard's constitutional claim "without merit." °5
2. Federal Court
Agard filed a habeas corpus petition in the district court for the
Eastern District of New York. The district court denied the petition,
concluding that while it was "troubled" by these comments and that
they came "'dangerously close to commenting on the exercise of a
[constitutional] right,"' they were not prejudicial enough to warrant
granting habeas relief.'0 6 The Second Circuit reversed, concluding
that the comments implied that a truthful defendant would either
stay out of the courtroom while other witnesses testified or testify
before other evidence was presented.' 7 This choice, it reasoned,
10 8
saddled Agard's confrontation rights and his right to testify.
Paying particular attention to a pair of Washington state cases,' 9
the Second Circuit distinguished between comments made during

102. Agard, 117 F.3d at 707.
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing the trial court transcript).
105. People v. Agard, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 241. The brief opinion does not even address Agard's
constitutional claim, stating simply that"[the court] has examined the defendant's remaining
contentions and finds them to be without merit." Id.
106. Agard, 117 F.3d at 707 (quoting the district court transcript). The court commented
that it had difficulty deciphering whether the district court viewed the remarks as
appropriate or whether they were harmless error. See id. at 707 n.4.
107. See id. at 709.
108. See id: at 709 & n.8.
109. See id. at 711 (comparing State v. Johnson, 908 P.2d 900 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), with
State v. Smith, 917 P.2d 1108 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)). In Smith, the defendant was convicted
of second degree rape. See Smith, 917 P.2d at 1109. The defendant testified and on crossexamination was confronted by the prosecutor with pictures of the crime scene. See id. at
1111-12. The prosecutor asked whether, before testifying, the defendant looked at the
photographs, read the discovery materials, and heard the testimony of others. See id. The
defendant claimed that the questions impermissibly focused on his right to be present in the
courtroom. See id. at 1112. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the questions "raised
an inference from Smith's testimony; they were not 'focused on the exercise of the
constitutional right itself.'" Id. (quoting Johnson, 908 P.2d at 900).
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cross-examination and those made first during summation."'
Concluding that each warrants a distinct constitutional analysis,
the court limited its holding to remarks brought forth for the first
time during summation."1 The Second Circuit's limited holding was
that "it is constitutional error for a prosecutor to insinuate to the
jury for the first time during summation that the defendant's
presence in the courtroom at trial provided him with a unique
opportunity to tailor his testimony to match the evidence."" 2
The court also concluded that the prosecutor's comments violated
Agard's Fifth Amendment right to testify on his own behalf "by
forcing [him] to choose between having his testimony viewed
without unfair comment or exercising his constitutional rights to
testify and to be present at trial.""' Finally, the court reasoned that
because the comments violated both Agard's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights, his trial was fundamentally unfair in violation
of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process."'

110. SeeAgard, 117 F.3d at 708-09.
111. See id. at 708 & n.6 (stating summation remarks occur too late for rebuttal).
112. Id. at 709. By analogy to Griffin v. California,the Second Circuit reasoned that the
prosecutor's summation remarks punished the defendant for exercising his constitutional
righttobe presentinthe courtroom by "invit[ing] the jury to consider the defendant's exercise
of his right to confrontation as evidence of guilt." Id. at 709. "The remarks are analogous to
the tactic of suggesting to juries that guilt can be implied from a defendant's decision to
exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to testify ....
Id.
The holding distinguished between a prosecutor's argument that a defendant in fact
tailored his testimony and one in which the prosecutor argues that the defendant's presence
in the courtroom provided him the opportunity to tailor his testimony. See id. at 711.
Reasoning that the prosecutor's remarks here were analogous to the latter, the court limited
its analysis to situations in which the prosecutor argued that the defendant's presence in the
courtroom throughout the trial provided him a unique opportunity to tailor his testimony. See
id. In determining whether this occurred, the court offered a generic three part test:
When ...a prosecutor raises the specter of fabrication 1) for the first time in
summation; 2) without facts in evidence to support the inference; or 3) in a
manner which directly attacks the defendant's right to be present during his
entire trial, our alarm bells begin to ring. When all three circumstances are
present, the bells become shrill sirens.
Id. Where all three are satisfied, the court reasoned the remarks raise suspicion from "the
shadows of unlitigated facts" that are not probative on the issue of credibility. Id.
113. Id. at 712. The court raised the Fifth Amendment issue sua sponte. See id. at 712
n.16.
114. See id. at 714. The dissent argued that a Griffin error does not automatically require
reversal of a defendant's conviction. See id. at 716-17 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (citing
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,22 (1966)). In Chapman,the Court stated: "[w ] e conclude
that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so
unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, notrequiringthe automatic reversal ofthe conviction." Chapman,386 U.S.
at 22. Instead, the dissent urged that the fundamental question is still whether the error
prejudiced the defendant. See Agard, 117 F.3d at 717 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia begins the majority opinion with a historical
overview of the Fifth Amendment, asserting that the process by
which a defendant was first brought to justice "obviated the need for
comments of [this sort]. " "' Justifying this conclusion on two
theories, Justice Scalia reasoned that the widespread use of pretrial
statements, which were compared to the defendant's statements at
trial, coupled with the fact that a defendant's testimony was not
evidence made arguments such as those seen in this case unnecessary." 6 As states began to recognize defendants as competent
witnesses, a tailoring insinuation was not commanded in those
states that required the defendant to testify before other evidence
was presented." 7 Justice Scalia observed that even in states that
did not require the defendant to testify first, there is no evidence
that these jurisdictions "took the affirmative step of forbidding

Arguing that it was obvious to the jury that Agard was present throughout the trial, the
dissent claimed to "search in vain for constitutional error." Id. at 718 (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the dissent accused the majority of"belittl[ing] the common sense of
jurors," by assuming that they could not distinguish between a defendant and a normal
witness. Id. at 719 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). In a sarcastic play on the majority's
reasoning, the dissent argued that it is difficult to visualize any juror concluding that if the
defendant was innocent "he would not have sat in the courtroom during the entire trial." Id.
at 719 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent took issue with the majority's
characterization that the prosecutor "raise[d] innuendo... from the shadows of unlitigated
facts for the first time in [summation]," arguing that the fabrication "pervaded the trial from
its opening day." Id. at 720 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent concluded
that the evidence presented at trial, coupled with the fact that Agard was convicted of only
three of nineteen counts, illustrated that the trial was not fundamentally unfair. See id. at
721 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
In response to the decision, the state filed a motion for rehearing. The court denied
the motion, but used the opportunity to clarify its holding, concluding that a prosecutor's
argument based on evidence that a defendant used his familiarity with the testimony of other
witnesses to tailor his own exculpatory story is acceptable. See Agard v. Portuondo, 159 F.3d
98, 99 (2d Cir. 1998). This argument, it reasoned, permissibly focuses on testimony related
to important events rather than the defendant's mere presence in the courtroom. See id.
Despite the clarification, the court concluded that the prosecutor's arguments were
nevertheless improper. See id.
115. Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 1123 (2000).
116. See id.
117. See id. For an example of the type of statute to which Justice Scalia is referring, see
the statute at issue in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S 605 (1972).
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118
comment on the defendant's opportunity to tailor his testimony."
Sparring with Justice Ginsburg over who has the burden to drum up
authority, Justice Scalia argued that neither Agard nor the dissent
could come up with a single case predating Griffin that supports the
contention that the remarks are unconstitutional."1 9 Thus, he
reasoned that comments similar to those in Agard were made
without objection until Griffin was decided. 2 ' In turn, he concluded
that Agard's claim depended solely on the Court's willingness to
expand Griffin's rationale. 2 '

The Court viewed Griffin as a "poor analogue" to the question
presented inAgard.'2 2 Reasoning that Griffin forbade a prosecutor
from inviting the jury to do something it was prohibited from doing,
Justice Scalia viewed the prosecutor's comments in this case as
inviting the jury to consider something to which it was completely
entitled." s The assumption is that it is reasonable to expect a jury
to comply with an instruction to disregard a defendant's silence
because the inclination to equate silence with guilt "is not always
'natural or irresistible.""2 4 In contrast, Justice Scalia assumed that
in assessing the defendant's credibility, "it is natural and irresistible" for the jury to consider the defendant's ability to hear the
testimony of other witnesses and the corresponding opportunity for
him to tailor his own testimony. 5 As such, Justice Scalia reasoned
that it is logical to instruct the jury not to consider the defendant's
silence as it looks at the other evidence presented in the case, but
illogical to simultaneously ask the jury to evaluate the defendant's
credibility, yet not consider a factor that weighs directly upon it.' 26
The majority reasoned that Griffin was distinguishable because
in that case the prohibited inference related to the jury's ultimate
determination of guilt, while the prosecutor's comments in Agard

118. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1123.
119. See id. at 1123-24 (stating "[we think the burden is rather upon the respondent and
the dissent, who assert the unconstitutionality of the practice, to come up with a case in
which such [urging] was held improper").
120. See id. at 1124.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. Id. (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615, for reasons as to why a defendant might
legitimately refuse to testify, including prejudice arising from prior convictions or a fear that
clever counsel will make him look bad).
125. Id.
126. See id.
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applied only to the defendant's credibility as a witness.12 7 The Court
believed that the prosecutor's comments in Agard were consistent
with "[the] longstanding rule" that a testifying defendant may have
his credibility assailed like that of any other witness.' 2 8 While Agard
pointed to Geders v. United States, 29 claiming that sequestration
orders affect defendants differently than other witnesses, 30 the
majority instead pointed to Jenkins v. Anderson,'' which stated
that "the Constitution does not forbid 'every government-imposed
choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the
exercise of constitutional rights." 3 2 The Court reasoned that
defendants are not afforded special treatment for issues pertaining
to credibility.'3 3 It also reasoned that the prosecutor's comments
were in line with Justice Brennan's conclusion in Brooks v. Tennessee 3' that "'the adversary system reposes judgment of the credibility
of all witnesses in the jury."'""8
The majority was also not persuaded that the "generic" nature of
the prosecutor's remarks levied them unconstitutional. 3 ' The Court
reasoned that the comments in Agard were no more generic than
the interested witness instruction upheld in Reagan v. United
States.'3 7 Similar to the charge that a defendant has an interest in
the outcome of the trial, the comments in Agard set forth "a
consideration" for the jury in assessing the credibility of the
defendant that then affects the determination of guilt. 3 Moreover,
Justice Scalia used Reagan to dispose of the Second Circuit's and
Justice Ginsburg's conclusion that there is a constitutional distinction between comments raised for the first time during summation
and those first elicited during cross-examination. 3 9 While Reagan
referenced a defendant's statutory right to testify, Justice Scalia
used Griffin's logic to attach constitutional significance to its

127. See id. at 1125.
128. Id.
129. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
130. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
131. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
132. Id. at 236 (quoting Chaffn v. Stynhcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973)).
133. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
134. 406 U.S. 605 (1970).
135. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1126 (quoting Brooks, 406 U.S. at 610). Brooks held that
requiring a defendant to testify first was not an appropriate means of securing the truth at
trial. See Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611.
136. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1126.
137. 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
138. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1126.
139. See id. at 1126.
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holding.14 He then concluded that because the interested witness
instruction in Reagan also occurred near the end of the trial, it was
of no constitutional consequence that the prosecutor's remarks in
Agard occurred first during summation. 4 '
Finally, the Court dismissed Agard's due process claim, first
arguing that, to the extent it was premised on a violation of Agard's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, the contention was incorrect.'
Moreover, the Court rejected Agard's assertion that the holding in
Doyle v. Ohio' prohibited the prosecutor's comments.' The Court
reasoned that a statute requiring a defendant's presence in the
courtroom does not contain "a similar promise of impunity" as the
giving of Mirandawarnings. 45 Justice Scalia argued that there is
"no authority whatever for the proposition that the impairment of
credibility, if any, caused by mandatory presence at trial violates
due process." 46 In support of this proposition, he reasoned that if
the threat to defendants was as significant as Agard claims, one
would expect defendants charged in jurisdictions without compulsory attendance policies to be absent from trial when they intended
to testify.147

140. See id. n.3 (responding to the dissent's position that Reagan is not constitutionally
based). While Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that Reagan dealt exclusively with a
defendant's statutory right to testify, see infra notes 160-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the dissents position), Justice Scalia reasoned that because Griffin relied on the
same statute in concluding that a defendant's silence may not be used as evidence against
him, it is unreasonable "to make Griffin the very centerpiece of one's case while
simultaneously denying that the statute construed in Reagan (and Griffin) has anything to
do with the meaning of the Constitution."Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1126 n.3.
141. See id. at 1127 (arguing that there is no constitutional distinction between remarks
made first during cross-examination and those made first during summation).
142. See id.
143. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
144. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1128; Brief of the Respondent, 1998 U.S. Briefs 1170, at *42,
Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000) (No. 98-1170) (arguingthat "since the government
imposes an affirmative duty on the defendant to be present at trial, it [is] fundamentally
unfair to then punish him for his compliance").
145. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1128 (citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982) (per
curiam) for the proposition that Doyle is "consistently explained... as a case where the
government had induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would
not be used against him").
146. Id.
147. See id.
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B. Justice Stevens's Concurrence
While Justice Stevens believed that the comments did not "cross
[]the high threshold that separates trial error-even serious trial
error-from the kind of fundamental unfairness for which the
Constitution requires that a state criminal conviction be set aside,"
he disagreed with the Court's tacit approval of the prosecutor's
comments. 4 8 He reasoned that such comments should be discouraged, asserting that nothing in the Court's opinion deprives the
states of their ability to prohibit this line of argument or to14 explain
9
to juries the necessity of the defendant's presence at trial.
C. Justice Ginsburg'sDissent
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the majority's rationale "transforms a defendant's presence at trial from a Sixth Amendment right
into an automatic burden on his credibility." 5 ' She reasoned that
both Griffin and Doyle stand for the proposition "that where the
exercise of constitutional rights is 'insolubly ambiguous' as between
innocence and guilt, a prosecutor may not unfairly encumber those
rights by urging the jury to construe the ambiguity against the
defendant."' 5 ' According to Justice Ginsburg, the majority's holding
fails to advance the search for the truth, because it does not consider
the fact that testimony is often consistent because it is truthful.'52
If all defendants have the right to attend their own trial, and in
many instances are required to attend their own trial, the majority's
holding "tarnishes" the guilty and innocent alike by allowing a
"generic accusation... tied only to the defendant's presence in the
courtroom."'53 Moreover, the jury is unable to measure the defendant's response to the accusation because the remarks occur after
the defendant has rested his case. 5'
In contrast, she believed that the Second Circuit's holding was "a
carefully restrained and moderate position," because it simply
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 1128-29 (Stevens, J., concurring).
See id. at 1129 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976)).
See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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limited a prosecutor from making a tailoring argument for the first
time during summation.'5 5 While she agreed that a defendant's
constitutional rights sometimes give way to competing concerns,
Justice Ginsburg argued that a tailoring insinuation made for the
first time during summation burdens the defendant's constitutional
rights without providing a compensating benefit.'56 In ajurisdiction
that limits the defendant's ability to introduce prior consistent
statements to bolster his own credibility-like New York, the
jurisdiction in which Agard was charged-she suggested that the
problem with this line of argument was particularly pronounced.'5 7
If the tailoring insinuation was presented during cross-examination,
the defendant would have the opportunity to prove that he gave a
similar version of the facts on a previous occasion."15 When the
argument is presented first during summation, however, the
prosecutor "can avert such rebuttal."'59
Justice Ginsburg also argued thatReaganprovided no support for
the majority's contention that remarks made first during summation are not constitutionally distinguishable from those made first
during cross-examination. 6 ° Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the
Reagan majority viewed a defendant's right to testify as deriving
from a statute.'6 1 Thus, she concluded that Reaganis not a constitutional decision and Griffin "provides no support for the Courtfs

155. Id. at 1130 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Justice Ginsburg read the Second Circuit's
opinion as allowing a prosecutor to argue that the defendants testimony "fit" with that of
other witnesses at any stage during the trial. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Moreover, she
reasoned that the Second Circuit would also allow a prosecutor to make the same argument
as presented in this case during cross-examination. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus,
she reasoned that the Second Circuit "reign[ed] in" a prosecutor's argument only when it
came too late for the defendant to have the opportunity to rebut the inference. Id. (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg distinguished remarks made for
the first time during summation from those made during cross-examination, arguing that the
latter might actually signal the jury that the defendant was lying. See id. (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). She reasoned that remarks brought forth for the first time during summation
also prohibit the defendant from answering the charges brought against him. See id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 1131 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
159. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
160. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
161. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that while Reagan did uphold the trial
judge's instruction as it related to credibility, the Court did not perceive the instruction as
burdening the defendant's Constitutional rights).
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unorthodox contention that Reagan's statutory holding was actually
of constitutional dimension."6 2
Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the majority's historical
perspective and its determination that the comments in Agard are
distinguishable from those made in Griffin.'6 3 In response to the
former, she argued that if such comments were not needed, then
they probably were not made.' 64 If the comments were not made,
then courts probably never had the opportunity to decide whether
or not they were appropriate.' 65 Thus, an absence of case law
provides no support for the contention that an unfounded tailoring
insinuation has been historically regarded as unproblematic. 1 66 In
regard to the latter proposition, she argued that the majority
misconstrued the Griffin opinion. 1 67 Citing Justice Scalia's dissent
in Mitchell v. United States, 68 she reasoned that inferring guilt from
silence is at least as "'natural or irresistible' as inferring that the
defendant had the opportunity to tailor his testimony by virtue of
his presence in the courtroom. 69 She then went an additional step,
claiming that to infer guilt from silence is actually more direct,
because unlike a tailoring inference "something beyond the simple
innocence of the defendant must be hypothesized in order to explain
the defendant's behavior." 7 ° Justice Ginsburg reasoned that "[i]t
makes little sense to maintain that juries able to avoid drawing
adverse inferences from a defendant's silence would be unable to

162. Id. at 1132 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (responding to the majority's argument that
because Griffin and Reagan addressed the same statute, Reagan must have a constitutional
dimension); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
163. See id. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
164. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). While Justice Scalia argued that an instruction from
the court that a defendant's silence is not to be used as evidence against him is appropriate
because the inference "is not always 'natural or irresistible," id. at 1124 (quoting Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609,615 (1965)), Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Griffin actually stated
that the inference is "not always so natural or irresistible." Id. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Thus, she reasoned that because the majority in Griffin stated that the inference
is not always natural, it realized "that [it] is indeed natural or irresistible in many, perhaps
most cases." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168. 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
169. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615).
In Mitchell, Justice Scalia stated that "[the Griffin rule] runs exactly counter to the normal
evidentiary inferences: IfI ask my son whether he saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch,
and he remains silent, the import of his silence is clear." Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 332 (1999)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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avoid thinking that only a defendant's opportunity to spin
a web of
171
lies could explain the seamlessness of his testimony.
Justice Ginsburg also argued that the Second Circuit did not
actually tell the jury to refrain from doing anything. 172 She reasoned
that if the majority is correct and the inference of tailoring is so
natural that a jury would automatically consider it, then the search
for the truth is not hampered by prohibiting a prosecutor from
inviting it to do so. 173 Pointing to Doyle, Justice Ginsburg concluded
that it is "unproblematic to hold that a prosecutor's latitude for
argument is narrower than a jury's latitude for assessment." 74
Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that where credibility of the
witness is the only factor for the jury to consider, an inference that
reflects negatively on the defendant's credibility may be used to
determine his guilt.1'7 5 Moreover, she reasoned that the majority's
reliance on Brooks and Jenkins was also misplaced, as both cases
stand for the proposition that a defendant may be impeached
through cross-examination.' 7 6
V. ANALYSIS
As indicated, the question presented in Agard pits the constitutional rights of the accused against a prosecutor's ability to argue
that the defendant is not credible. The Court concluded that the
prosecutor's comments in Agard advanced the search for the truth
at trial without punishing the defendant in the process.7 Reviewing
the Court's historical analysis first, it is difficult to reconcile the
Court's assertion that an absence ofjudicial decisions translates to
an endorsement of the propriety of the prosecutor's remarks. By
Justice Scalia's own admission, comments like these were made
171. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
172. See id. n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. See id. nn. 6-7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This argument is a response to Justice
Scalia's assertion that the defendant's opportunity to tailor his testimony is a natural
conclusion for the jury to reach in evaluating the defendant's credibility. See id. at 1124;
supra note 125 and accompanying text.
174. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
175. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is dominantly in cases where the physical
evidence is inconclusive that prosecutors will concentrate all available firepower on the
credibility of the testifying defendant.").
176. See id.(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that these decisions are in accordance "with
the moderate restriction" the majority rejects).
177. See id. at 1127 (stating the comments are "appropriate... to the central function of
the trial, which is to discover the truth").
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largely unnecessary due to historical trial procedure." 8 Thus, as
Justice Ginsburg pointed out, if the comments were not necessary
then it is quite likely that they were not made. 9 If they were not
made, it is likely that courts did not have the opportunity to decide
whether or not they were constitutional.' More importantly, if the
issue was not addressed then it is logical to assume that the issue
was open for debate.''
The majority criticizes the dissent for failing to drum up any preGriffin case that supports the contention that the prosecutor's
remarks in Agard are unconstitutional.'8 2 The opinion asserts that
"[e]vidently, prosecutors were making these comments all along
without objection; Griffin simply sparked the notion that such
commentary might be problematic." 8 ' Supposing that this insinuation is true, it does not appear helpful to the constitutional analysis.
Apparently, at least in several states, prosecutors were making
inferences regarding a defendant's refusal to testify long before the
practice was found unconstitutional by the Court in Griffin.'84 Alack
of judicial interpretation of any kind is simply not an adequate
indication that the argument is constitutional.'8 5 Moreover, because
the inference in this case also derives from the defendant's choice to
exercise a constitutional right, Griffin itself is the historical
framework that the majority claims is lacking.
The Court, however, distinguished the inference made in Agard
from that made in Griffin.'8 6 Reasoning that Griffin prohibited an
inference that went to the defendant's guilt, the Court concluded
that an unfounded tailoring insinuation only goes to his
credibility.'8 7 Griffin, however, was premised on the idea that using
a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to refrain from testifying as
evidence against him was unconstitutional because it penalized the

178. See id. at 1123-24.
179. See id. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 1134 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 1123-24.
183. Id. at 1124.
184. The Court in Griffin noted that six states allowed for such comments. See Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 611 n.3 (1965).
185. SeeAgard, 120 S. Ct. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The point is simply that ifthe
Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution, it is illogical to argue that it can
be assumed that a given practice is indeed constitutional until the Court has examined the
practice in question.
186. See id. at 1124-25.
187. See id. at 1125.
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defendant for assertingthat right.188 The Court specifically stated
that "[the inference] is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly."'89 One point of contention with the majority's
holding is its failure to reconcile this reasoning with its decision. A
defendant has both the constitutional right to remain silent and the
constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. When the
defendant's right to confrontation is used to impeach him, Griffin's
plain language is implicated because assertion of that right is made
"costly." The "cost" to the defendant is that he is forced to forgo his
right to testify or risk comment by the prosecutor. 90
Even if the comments go directly to the defendant's credibility,
this distinction is not as significant as the majority contends. In
many, if not most, cases credibility is the only issue for the jury to
resolve. 9 ' Thus, credibility is often synonymous with guilt."' While
it might be illogical to ask a jury to assess a testifying defendant's
credibility while disregarding a factor bearing directly upon it,'93 an
unfounded tailoring insinuation does not reveal any evidence of
fabrication. Therefore, the insinuation might have a profound effect
on the wrongly accused.' 94
In support of its credibility distinction, the Court cites cases that
reference cross-examination.' 95 For example, the Court cites Brooks
v. Tennessee,196 asserting that the adversary process demands that
a defendant's opportunity to tailor his testimony be brought to the
jury's attention.'97 Because the Court in Brooks, recognized that a
defendant's presence in the courtroom created a greater opportunity

188. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
189. Id. (emphasis added),
190. See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 709 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1997) (arguing the same).
191. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1133 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that credibility is so
often the only issue for the jury to resolve).
192. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 1124.
194. See id. at 1131 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
195. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235-36 (1980) (stating that defendant
may be cross-examined); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 609 (1972) (stating that a
defendant's choice to take the stand bears risk of cross-examination); Brown v. United States,
356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (stating that breadth of waiver of right to remain silent is the
scope of cross-examination); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305 (1895) (stating that
testifying witness may have credibility assailed).
196. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
197. See Agard, 120 S.Ct. at 1126 ("The adversary system surely envisions-indeed it
requires-that the prosecutor be allowed to bring to the jury's attention the danger [risk of
peijury] that the Court was aware of.").
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for perjury, and that the credibility of all witnesses is an issue for
the jury, 98 the majority reasoned that the comments inAgardwere
a legitimate attack.' 99 The Court failed to consider, however, that
an increased opportunity to commit perjury does not justify a
wholesale invasion of a defendant's constitutional rights.2 0 0
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg contends that Brooks merely stands
for the proposition that "cross-examination can expose a defendant
who tailors his testimony."2 ' This seems a more plausible argument
given that Brooks's reasoning was based on Griffin."2 Since Griffin
prohibits an inference of guilt derived from a defendant's decision to
remain silent, it is a stretch to assume that Brooks somehow
endorses the inference upheld in this case. Justice Ginsburg's
interpretation is also consistent with the longstanding notion that
"cross-examination[ I [is] 'the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth."'20 3 When a witness is questioned, the jury is
able to listen to his response and evaluate his demeanor.20 4 These
observations provide the jury with something more concrete to judge
the defendant's credibility than a prosecutor's mere speculation.20 5
Thus, the jury is able not only to assess the credibility of the
defendant, but to assess the legitimacy of the prosecutor's contentions as well. This opportunity is lost when the remarks are made
for the first time in summation.
Nevertheless, the majority reasoned that Reagan allows for a
generic attack on a defendant's credibility, even when the attack
occurs first during summation.2 6 This proposition, however, is
flawed. As a preliminary matter, Reagan concerned a federal statute

198. See Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611.
199. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1125.
200. See Brooks, 406 U.S at 611 ("Pressuring the defendant to take the stand, by
foreclosing later testimony if he refuses, is not a constitutionally permissible means of
ensuring his honesty.").
201. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1135 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 233,
238 and Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609-12).
202. See Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,614 (1965) and
asserting that Tennessee's statute made assertion of the right to testify costly).
203. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367
(1940)).
204. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing the same).
205. See Brief of the Respondent, 1998 U.S. Briefs 1170, at *15, Portuondo v. Agard, 120
S. Ct. 1119 (2000) (No. 98-1170) (arguing that without evidence of tailoring the prosecutor's
comments amounted to speculation and innuendo).
206. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1126,1133 (arguingthat there is no constitutional distinction
between comments made during cross-examination and those made first in summation).
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and has no bearing on the constitutional question in Agard.
Moreover, even ifReagan was a constitutional decision, the holding
does not support the propriety of the prosecutor's comments in
Agard. Reagan concluded that when a defendant chooses to testify,
the jury may be instructed that his interest in the trial creates an
incentive to lie. 2°' The conclusion stemmed from a belief that a
defendant who chooses to take the witness stand may have his
credibility assailed like that of any other witness. 2 9 As a corollary,
the Court also concluded that a defendant is not subject to harsher
treatment.2 1 For example, the Court stated that "[a] court is not at
liberty to charge directly or indirectly that the defendant is to be
disbelieved because he is a defendant."2 '

When a tailoring insinuation based solely on the defendant's
presence in the courtroom is made, the jury is told, indirectly, that
the defendant is not to be believed simply because he is a defendant.
Since the defendant is, ordinarily, the only witness entitled to
remain in the courtroom, attacking his testimony based solely on his
presence at trial provides the jury a reason to doubt the defendant's
story that is not possible with regard to other witnesses. In general,
the interest of any witness may be exposed to the jury.2 1 Therefore,
unlike an insinuation that the defendant had the opportunity to lie,
the focus of the interested witness doctrine does not reflect the
defendant's status per se."'3 This distinction reveals the difference
between a proper attack on credibility and a penalty imposed on a
"defendantfor exercising his constitutional rights. When the attack
ceases to treat all witnesses the same, it becomes a penalty.

207. See id. at 1131 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Reagan relied on a statute,
"not on any constitutional prescription").
is
208. See Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305 (1985) (stating that while "[iut
within the province of the court" to point out matters that affect credibility, it is improper to
charge the jury directly that a particular witness is not credible).
209. See id.(stating the defendant maybe fully cross-examined and impeached). 'The jury
[may] properly consider his manner of testifying, the inherent probabilities of his story, the
amount and character of the contradictory testimony, the nature and extent of his interest
in the result of the trial, and the impeaching evidence." Id.
210. See id. (stating "the limits of suggestion are the same in respect to [the defendant] as
to others").
211. Id. at 310 (emphasis added).
212. See Brief of the Respondent, 1998 U.S. Briefs 1170, at *27, Portuondo v. Agard, 120
S.Ct. 1119 (2000) (No. 98-1170) (arguing that "comments on a defendant's interest, and
attendant motive to lie, do not concomitantly convert the defendant's exercise of a
constitutional right into an unfair litigation advantage").
213. See id. (stating "all trial witnesses, by definition, testify, and the interest of any
witness is an appropriate subject for comment").
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The majority also contends that the insinuation did not violate
Agard's right to due process.214 In so doing, the Court cites Jenkins
v. Anderson215 for the proposition that a defendant's constitutional
rights may sometimes give way to competing concerns,216 while
rejecting the argument that the prosecutor's insinuation in Agard
paralleled the due process violation recognized in Doyle v. Ohio. 1
The majority saw a similarity between the argument rejected in
Jenkins and the argument made byAgard in this case.218 In Jenkins,
the defendant claimed that a person facing arrest will be less likely
to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent if his failure
to speak can later be used to impeach his testimony. 21 9 By the same
token, both Agard and the Second Circuit reasoned that if a
defendant knows that he will be subject to a tailoring insinuation,
he will be less likely to testify at trial or confront the witnesses
against him.220 Having rejected the former argument, the Court in
Agard found it easier to reject the latter. An interesting note,
however, is that the Court in Jenkins distinguished between
prearrest and postarrestsilence. 22 ' Whereas, in Doyle, the defendant's due process rights were violated because the defendant was
told he could remain silent,222 the Court in Jenkins reasoned that
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were not applicable
because he was not yet under arrest.223 Since the government had
not induced his prearrest silence, it was not a due process violation
to use his silence against him.224
The Constitution not only grants a defendant the right to confront
the witnesses against him, but the defendant's presence at trial is
often required. 225 Thus, whether the defendant chooses or is

compelled to be present at trial, Doyle must be applicable. If the
defendant chooses to be present in the courtroom, then the scenario
mirrors Doyle in that the defendant is offered a privilege and then
214. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1127-28.
215. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
216. SeeAgard, 120 S. Ct. at 1124 (citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,236 (1980)).
217. See id. at 1128.
218. See id. at 1125 (stating that the arguments are "strikingly similar").
219. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236.
220. See Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 712 (2d Cir. 1997); Brief of the Respondent,
1998 U.S. Briefs 1170, at *29, Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000) (No. 98-1170).
221. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238-40.
222. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
223. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40.
224. See id. at 240.
225. See, e.g., FED R. CRIM. P. 43 (with limited exceptions defendant shall attend and has
a duty to remain at trial); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw 260 §§ 210, 340.50 (Consol. 1996).
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has it used against him. When the defendant is compelled to be
present in the courtroom, the scenario is in fact worse, because his
only opportunity to avoid the insinuation is to forfeit his right to
testify. 226 The majority attempts to counter this argument by

suggesting that it has "'consistently explained Doyle as a case where
the government had induced silence by implicitly assuring the
defendant that his silence would not be used against him."' 227 The
Court stated that "a similar promise of impunity is [not] implicit in
a statute requiring the defendant to be present at trial."228 What the
majority does not explain, however, is why an implicit promise of
impunity is a necessary prerequisite to a due process violation.
Whereas the defendant in Doyle was induced by a promise, Agard
was induced by a legal command. As such, this method of impeachment seems22 9closer to trial by inquisition than a legitimate attack on
credibility.
VI. RAMIFICATIONS

This note invites the reader to consider a factual scenario. In that
scenario, an innocent person is charged with a crime that he did not
commit. He is forced to attend his own trial and he chooses to testify
on his own behalf. He is cross-examined and no evidence of fabrication is revealed. The other evidence presented at the trial is also
inconclusive. Nevertheless, the prosecutor is able to successfully
attack the person's credibility and attain a conviction. He is able to
do so because of the argument upheld in Agard. Moreover, he is able
to do so without demonstrating any factual basis for his contention.
While the conviction of an innocent person is, admittedly, an
extreme example, the increased possibility that this will occur is the
most troubling aspect of the Court's holding.
While the Court attempts to advance the fight against crime, it
fails to consider the effect that this holding will have on the
improperly accused. In its rush to defend the prosecutor, the Court
forgets that a defendant's testimony will be consistent with that of
226. See Brief of the Respondent, 1998 U.S. Briefs 1170, at *12, Portuondo v. Agard, 120
S. Ct. 1119 (2000) (No. 98-1170).
227. Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1128 (quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 445 U.S. 603, 606 (1982) (per

curium)).
228. Id.
229. See supranotes 54-57 and accompanyingtext; Mitchellv. United States, 526 U.S. 314,
325 (1999) (condemning proceedings designed to enhance the government's prosecutorial
power).
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other witnesses when he is telling the truth. ° Moreover, while the
Court offers reasons as to why a prosecutor can be allowed to make
this argument, it never once offers a reason as to why she should be
allowed.23'
In large measure, the Court bases its conclusion on a one
hundred-year-old case2 32 that dealt with a defendant's statutory
right to testify at a time when it was widely presumed that a
defendant did not have a constitutional right to testify. 3 3 Ironically,

even in that case the Court did not allow the defendant to be
directly accused of fabricating his testimony.2 34 Not so inAgard.The
Court makes it clear that a prosecutor may actually accuse the
defendant of tailoring
his testimony based solely on his presence in
235
courtroom.
the
The ramifications of theAgard decision are best understood when
viewed from the perspective of what the Second Circuit's holding
actually forbade. The Second Circuit only prohibited a prosecutor
from making a tailoring insinuation for the first time during
summation. 3 6 The prosecutor could still argue that the defendant's
testimony "fit," and the prosecutor could still cross-examine the
defendant about his opportunity to hear the testimony of others.
In essence, the Second Circuit's holding implied nothing more than
a defendant should have the opportunity to rebut a charge that he
is lying. As Justice Ginsburg described it, the
Second Circuit's
2 38
holding was "restrained," and appropriately so.

230. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1129 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brief of Respondent, 1998
U.S. Briefs 1170, at *13, Portuondo v. Agard, 120 S. Ct. 1119 (2000) (No. 98-1170).
231. Cf Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1127 n.4 ("Our decision.., is addressed to whether the
comment is permissible as a constitutional matter, and not to whether it is always desirable

as a matter of sound trial practice.").
232. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895).
233. See Agard, 120 S. Ct. at 1131 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one in [Reagan]
suggested that the trial court's comment exacted a penalty for the exercise of any
constitutional right."). For a discussion of the transition from a defendant's presumed
incompetency to the modern view that a defendant is competent to testify, see Fergusonv.
Georgia,365 U.S. 570, 573-82 (1961).
234. See Reagan, 157 U.S. at 305 (stating that the court may not "arbitrarily single out
[defendant's] testimony and denounce it as false").
235. See Agard, 120 S.Ct. at 1124 n.1 ("Drawing the line between pointing out the
availability of the inference and inviting the inference would be neither useful or
practicable.").
236. See Agard v. Portundo, 117 F.3d 696, 711 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Lawyers may not raise
innuendo relating to bias or credibility... for the first time in their closing arguments.").
237. See id.

238. Agard, 120 S.Ct. at 1130 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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While the Court's opinion does not necessarily mean that the
prosecutor's arguments inAgardwill become common, it does mean
that they are likely to become more frequent. With the Court's
endorsement, any time a prosecutor is faced with the real possibility
of an acquittal, he can now turn to an unfounded tailoring insinuation in hopes of swaying the jury. Regardless of the latitude given
individual courts to prohibit such attacks, the Court's holding
ensures that this argument will be used more frequently, if for no
other reason than it is constitutional and likely to be effective. As
states seek to increase criminal convictions, even fair-minded
legislators and judges will find it difficult to prohibit an argument
that furthers this goal.
VII. CONCLUSION

Just last year, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Mitchell
v. United States, concluded that "[t]he rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching that the question in a
criminal case is not whether the defendant committed the acts of
which he is accused.... [but] whether the Government has carried
its burden to prove its allegations while respecting the defendant's
individual rights."239 The argument upheld in Agard is directly
counter to this assertion. Legitimizing an unfounded tailoring
insinuation means that the government must prove nothing in order
to argue that the defendant is lying. In fact, under the Court's
holding, a prosecutor is almost better off if the defendant's testimony is consistent with that of other witnesses, because consistent
testimony provides him a legitimate and greater means of attacking
the defendant's credibility. In a system that commands a standard
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal trials, this is an odd
proposition.
A defendant's constitutional rights are designed to ensure that he
is provided a fair trial. While a defendant is by no means entitled to
a perfect trial, the penalty analysis at least assures a defendant that
his constitutional rights will not be used against him. The Court's
decision in Agard takes this a step backward.
J. FieldingDouthat, Jr.

239. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 330.

